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Book Reviews
The Official C.I.A. Manual of Trickery and Deception. By H. 
Keith Melton, Robert Wallace and John Mulholland. New York, 
NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-06-172589-
0. Bibliography. Notes. Index. Pp. 250. $24.99
This interesting book purports to reproduce a special manual for trickery 
and deception written by one of the world's great magicians, John Mul-
holland, working under contract to the Central Intelligence Agency. This 
contract was part of a super-secret program code-named MKULTRA that 
was authorized in March 1953 by Allen Dulles, DCI. "The research 
included clandestine acquisition of drugs, clinical testing on and experi-
mentation with humans, some of whom were unaware of said testing, and 
grant proposals and contracts with hospitals, companies, and individuals" 
(p. 5). Supposedly "all of the program's reports and operational files on 
the 'research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological 
materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control 
human behavior' were ordered destroyed by DCI Richard Helms in 1973" 
(pp. 15–16). But somehow this manual on magic and deception survived, 
only to be discovered many years later.
The introduction to the Mulholland volume is written by Melton and Wal-
lace. It covers the MKULTRA activities and gives many examples of its 
products, including a robust description of attempts to assassinate Fidel 
Castro with "hallucinogenic sprays and cigars," "contaminated boots," 
"depilatory, poisoned and exploding cigars," "exploding seashells," a 
"contaminated diving suit," and a "poisoned pen" (pp. 12–13).
Their lengthy introductory chapter contains a mini-history of the art of 
deception during the Cold War, primarily against the Soviet Union, and is 
complete with interesting diagrams of items such as a CIA Escape and 
Evasion Rectal Suppository, Gary Power's silver dollar that had a secret 
pen inside for committing suicide, the gas tank in a car that was half-filled 
with a compartment for smuggling persons, and spy coins that have secret 
compartments for carrying microdots, or cipher books.
It reports that Mulholland was hired in 1956 to think about "the applica-
tion of the magician's techniques to clandestine operations, such tech-
niques to include surreptitious delivery of materials, deceptive 
movements and actions to cover normally prohibited activities, influenc-
ing choices and perceptions of other persons, various forms of disguise; 
covert signaling systems, etc." (p. 15).
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The heart of the book is a reproduction of the manual written by Mulhol-
land. It has a section with "general comments" on deception and then fol-
lows with instruction on how to drop tablets or powders into the drink of 
the target person. It also coaches on techniques for "removal of objects," 
e.g., how to take things without being noticed. There also is an interesting 
set of observations about women, and how they must act differently.
One of my favorite sections is the overview, which contains some great 
quotations such as: "successful deception depends so much on attitude of 
mind" (p. 69) and "it takes practice to tell a convincing lie" (p. 69). So 
much of the technique of deception depends on practice, and use of very 
common movements, combined with urgent attention to doing anything 
at all that anyone will take note of. "A person who seems to be interested 
in what it is he is doing will not be noticed, but one whose interest is 
directed toward what others are doing will attract attention" (p. 83). "[H]e 
should be so normal in manner, and his actions so natural, that nothing 
about him excites suspicion...[H]e has to be himself—as he is at his calm-
est moments...be comfortably natural or, at least, to give that appearance" 
(p. 85). Another gem: "When the mind has been deceived, it is almost 
impossible to work backward and discover the deception" (p. 88). There is 
no need to give away all of the secrets of the book, but some of the cover-
age includes how to drop a pill from a matchbook while appearing to light 
the target's cigarette, or dropping a pill from the side of a coin. There even 
is coaching on the "exaggerated expression of dumbness" (p. 103). Pow-
ders are put into pencils under the eraser, and liquids are dispensed in a 
variety of ways, including from a handkerchief. Instruction on how to 
steal an important piece of paper and within the blink of an eye have it 
folded six times and stuffed in a pocket without making any noise is 
another part of the coverage.
What is amazing about Mulholland's manual is not so much the various 
techniques of transporting things, such as having items hidden inside hol-
lowed out coins, but instead the careful description he gives of the move-
ments needed to use these various instruments. For example, there is a 
six-step procedure for taking something away from a table right in front of 
another person's eyes in a way that they will not notice it (pp. 154–155). 
The manual ends with a section on recognition signals including tying 
one's shoelaces in a unique way.
There is much more in the book than in this review, and if one is inter-
ested in the espionage training of a bygone era, this book is of great his-
torical interest. The authors, Melton and Wallace, are experts in 
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espionage and, judging from some of the rare and obscure references 
listed in their notes, they have managed to get access to some very special 
materials.
The foreword by John Mclaughlin, former Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence, who also happens to be a magician, provides the overall 
rationale for the project: "Just as a magician's methods must elude detec-
tion in front of a closely attentive audience, so an intelligence officer doing 
espionage work must elude close surveillance and pass messages with 
material without detection" (p. xii).
The only criticism I have concerns HarperCollins. It chose to use dreadful 
paper stock for the book, which as a result looks like it is printed on grade 
school drawing paper. I would not expect a long shelf life. Nevertheless, in 
spite of this minor problem, this book is well worth purchasing and read-
ing by anyone interested in this arcane corner of the espionage world.
Edward M. Roche, Henley-Putnam University
Roche et al.: Book Reviews
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010Journal of Strategic Security
72
The Counterterrorist Manual: A Practical Guide to Elite 
International Units. Leroy Thompson. London, UK: Frontline 
Books, 2009. ISBN: 978-1-84832-514-2. Photographs. Glossary. 
Index. 256 pp. £19.99.
Leroy Thompson's latest book summarizes his previous works (over 30 
books and 1,000 articles) in a handy reference guide to worldwide Coun-
terterrorist (CT) forces. This basic textbook provides a history of CT units 
around the world plus their methods for recruiting, selecting, and training 
operators and their organization, weapons, missions, and tactics.
The author has been called knowledgeable and respected, and is a noted 
expert on the subject of counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and VIP protec-
tion. His previous books cover combat knives, SWAT, bodyguard protec-
tion, specific historical US and UK commando units, counterinsurgency, 
WWII and Cold War elite force histories, guns, uniforms, badges, and 
insignias.
This book summarizes his previous books that go into more details about 
specific units, weapons, and tactics. It collates information, giving a good 
overview of the subject, and adds to the field by serving as a broad, single-
volume summary reference guide to international elite forces. The main 
argument throughout the book points towards the continuing need for 
elite forces to combat terrorist activities even in the smallest countries.
The special attraction of this book is its summary of information in one 
volume, but it lacks details of each area. Although the book covers many 
topics, it suffers from a lack of depth and detail that would make it a truly 
comprehensive, analytical compendium of CT units. It spends too many 
pages on vehicle delivery but only briefly mentions dignitary protection, 
air marshals, and WMD. Since these areas are outside the direct subject of 
this book and little information is included, these sections could have 
been deleted, or reference to the author's previous works could have been 
provided for more details. The author only references two of his previous 
books in the suggested reading list.
This book would be of use to beginners in the CT field, for instructional 
use, and for general orientation to international CT units, but only a refer-
ence guide for those seriously interested in the intelligence and CT profes-
sion. As such, it will supply the basic needs of those interested in this 
subject and act as a good reference guide for professional office use, but 
readers should look to other sources for the details required for profes-
sional CT analysis. Intelligence, CT, CI, HLS and protection professionals 
should consult some of the author's previous writings and books for such 
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details, even such details as may be found on Wikipedia. By looking up an 
organization (e.g., GSG-9) or specific equipment (e.g., H&K MP5) on 
Wikipedia, you'll find details of history, use, and specifications—much 
more than in this reference book.
The first half of the book describes the history of worldwide CT organiza-
tions and their methods for recruiting, selecting, and training operators. 
The second half of the book is devoted to weapons, equipment, missions, 
and tactics. It includes a glossary of abbreviations and an index, both use-
ful in reference material.
Chapter 1 outlines the terrorist incidents from the 1972 Munich Olympics 
terrorist attack through the 1990s. It shows the history of why CT units 
were created by almost every country in the world to protect citizens from 
terrorist attacks in the future. Just like any game of cat and mouse, terror-
ists are always trying new ideas to thwart CT training and preparation. 
The 9/11 attacks on the US were evidence of new and unanticipated 
attacks to defeat the potential for CT forces to intercede and prevent the 
completion of their missions.
Chapter 2 reveals the selection process in general and for a few specific 
units. It describes the basics of finding, testing, and picking the "best of 
the best" from existing military, paramilitary, and police forces. The out-
come is selecting the most physically fit and highly motivated applicants 
for the next phase—training.
Chapter 3 details the training regimen for a few specific units, describing 
the CT operational phases, small unit tactics, modes of delivery (air, sea, 
and land), and techniques for operations (surveillance, negotiation, intel-
ligence collection), as well as the needed skills for successful operations 
(communications, weapons expertise, combat techniques).
Chapter 4, the shortest chapter, briefly describes the basic organization of 
CT units with some specifics on a half dozen or so of the most well known. 
Although interesting, military organization doesn't seem as important or 
detailed as other chapters.
Chapter 5 reviews the most frequently used types of weapons, primarily 
guns, as well as surveillance and entry equipment and delivery vehicles. It 
does not cover knives and other weapons, but does include almost five 
pages on optical sights and twelve pages on vehicles.
The last chapter, Chapter 6, covers specific cases (hostage rescue, entry 
into buildings, aircraft, trains, buses, and ships, dignitary protection, 
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training exchanges), but has only a page dealing with Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD). It would have been more useful to spend a few pages 
discussing the importance of elite forces in dealing with WMDs.
Overall, this book is a good historical reference work but only as an 
overview of CT forces. It is well illustrated, describing the tools, 
techniques, and procedures of global elite forces—not just the US—and is 
a very helpful single reference volume for CT units. As a comprehensive 
reference work on the subject, it is worth having it within easy reach on 
your bookshelf.
John Coale, Henley-Putnam University
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An End to Al-Qaeda: Destroying Bin Laden's Jihad and 
Restoring America's Honor. By Malcolm Nance. New York, NY: 
St. Martin's Press, 2010. ISBN: 978-0-312-59249-3. Notes. 
Index. 296 pages. $25.99 Hardcover.
An End to Al-Qaeda presents a thought-provoking discussion about Al-
Qaeda (AQ), its leadership, intentions, and attempts to recruit members 
in the ideological battlefield. It makes recommendations about engaging 
AQ and its information operations in order to decrease its support and 
undermine the group's efforts to dominate the debate about the evolution 
and trajectory of Islam. The book draws on the author's expertise as a 
counterterrorism (CT) officer and Arabic linguist, and his experience 
studying AQ in the field, including in combat. Malcolm Nance uses his 
twenty-eight years of experience in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia to craft recommendations and guidance for engaging and 
defeating AQ in the psychological and ideological battle space.
Nance's book presents AQ as an organization seeking to take advantage of 
the decline of American stature in the arena of world politics, which pro-
vides fodder for the group's information operations. According to Nance, 
AQ and its leader, Usama bin Laden, have the advantage in the ideological 
battle field, and it is up to America to change that. The book provides a 
healthy critique of the Bush Administration's efforts to fight the "War on 
Terror" and proposes steps to counter AQ's "cultish fringe" (p. 55) ideo-
logues and win back the psychological and moral advantage. Nance's book 
comes at a pivotal point in the development and growth of the field of CT. 
He argues, quite compellingly, that there is a distinct spectrum within 
Islam, and perceiving Islam as the enemy does more to fuel ibn Laden's 
psychological warfare campaign than defeat it. This book offers a refresh-
ing argument that Islam is not the enemy and that the efforts of some ele-
ments of the media to demonize it are compromising the attempts of US 
counterterrorism strategists to reshape and reconstruct America's CT nar-
rative. Although some of Nance's ideas and observations are not new to 
the Intelligence and CT communities, he does offer a viewpoint supported 
by decades of service in the field and a working knowledge of the Arabic 
language, culture, and people.
Nance constructs the main argument for his book by first identifying the 
problem of turning the tables on AQ in the ideological battle, then defines 
and discusses the complexity of his thesis in context to the evolution of 
Islam in a post 9/11 world. Finally, he provides strategies to resolve the 
issues by proposing methods of fighting in the psychological theatre of 
war. He offers real-world examples from his experience in the field which 
help to add to his credibility as an author. An End to Al-Qaeda is a fast-
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moving, appealing read for those analysts and operators either new to the 
field of CT or who have been in the field for less than a decade. Nance is 
right to delineate AQ as unqualified to offer religious guidance and advice, 
and he offers specific ideas and recommendations to fight the war of 
ideas. The book grows in its sophistication as the chapters progress and 
helps the reader to delve below surface arguments of the tired phrase, 
"winning hearts and minds." Nance invigorates the debate within the CT 
analytical community as to how much attention and effort should be paid 
to the use of language and framing. Nance's book will be useful for those 
CT analysts and operators working in the beginning to intermediate level 
analysis of AQ because it does not necessarily provide any new academic 
insights per se, but leads an important and relevant discussion into the 
inner workings of AQ's psychological operations and the ideological 
underpinnings of the members' arguments which influence recruitment 
and sustainment efforts. The book does, however, help to correct the tra-
jectory of some CT analysis which has gotten mired in the emotional and 
subjective judgments of AQ and which does not help strategists tease out 
the key problems which must be addressed in order to move forward.
The book does fall short in defining the "Muslim world" as diverse, both 
in commitment to faith, worship, practice, tradition, and geographic 
diversity, and how an ideological battle would tackle this diversity chal-
lenge. Nance argues the US must break AQ's links to Islam using several 
strategies. For example, he recommends starting a "social epidemic of 
rejection" by "revealing and hammering into the public consciousness the 
ideological plan of the New Islamic Caliphate" (p. 227). However, there is 
no monolithic Muslim population with which to implement this ideologi-
cal plan. Muslims live in every corner of the world and have different life 
experiences and relationships to their religion. From the secular Muslim 
Turk to the Arab-American Shi'a beauty queen, Muslims vary in their 
commitment and level of belief, just as members of any organized reli-
gion. It is practically impossible to institute a widespread public relations 
campaign against a state-less organization and network such as AQ with-
out addressing those public grievances that bind the scattered and diverse 
Muslim population around the world together (in most cases), such as 
Palestine, human rights, and the freedom for oppositional participation in 
the political process. If Nance would supplement his argument with the 
prerequisite foreign policy requirements prior to entering the ideological 
battle space, his book would be rooted in a much stronger foundation and 
his recommendations for separating AQ from the larger Muslim popula-
tion of the world would have more merit. In many parts of the world vul-
nerable to AQ's messaging, actions speak louder than words. If a massive 
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information operation is to take place to challenge AQ in the field of infor-
mation warfare, the major foreign policy issues of concern must be kineti-
cally addressed and not just verbally bantered about.
From a geopolitical perspective, Nance's book avoids discussing the non-
ideological opportunities to address America's standing in the world, 
which is fundamental prior to beginning any ideological campaign efforts. 
He does not bring forth the necessary and sufficient conditions which 
must be changed before the target audience for ideological battle would 
even be ready or open to receive a reformed narrative. These are the 
issues of good governance; equal and fair political participation for oppo-
sition parties in the Arab world (as well as the non-Arab Islamic Republic 
of Iran); economic growth and opportunity for minorities of Arab descent 
in Israel; the creation of an independent, sovereign, and contiguous Pal-
estinian state; and human rights in countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
and Iran. Part and parcel of fighting the ideological battle in the Arab and 
non-Arab Middle East is having a receptive and willing audience; but the 
perception of the US in many parts of the Arab and non-Arab world has 
been severely damaged over the last decade. Europe and Asia are increas-
ingly unhappy with US foreign policy and inflexibility on issues such as 
Gaza, the separation barrier along the West Bank, freedom of speech in 
Egypt, and women's rights in Saudi Arabia. Nance has excellent ideas for 
the CT and Intelligence communities on attacking the ideological conflict, 
but offers few recommendations for readying the field for battle.
An End to Al-Qaeda is a good read for those analysts in the CT commu-
nity still developing their understanding of information operations and 
understanding the role of religion in the battle between AQ and the rest of 
the world's Muslims, but the reader must also be aware of the larger ties 
that bind both Muslims and non-Muslims alike, such as a desire for good 
governance, a sovereign and contiguous Palestinian state, and free and 
fair elections throughout the larger Middle East and South Asia. Overall, 
the book is worth buying; Nance captivates the reader with his experience 
and personal connection to the Arab world and constructs an interesting 
strategy for engaging AQ in the ideological battlefield. It would do the 
reader well, however, to understand the foreign policy prerequisites 
which must be in place before employing information operations to 
amplify efforts to restructure the anti-AQ narrative.
Keely M. Fahoum, Henley-Putnam University
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God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of 
Modern Jihad. By Charles Allen. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 
Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group, 2006. ISBN-13: 
978-0-306-81522-5. Maps. Photographs. Glossary. Notes. 
Sources cited. Index. Pp xiv, 349. $16.15.
"Know your enemy as you know yourself and in a hundred battles you will 
not be defeated!" That admonition written over two thousand years ago 
by Sun Tzu is as timeless a truth as can be found amongst the body of 
work left by all of history's great thinkers on strategy, operations, and tac-
tics. So it holds true with the matter of combating modern 21st century 
terrorism, and especially so with understanding the motivations of the 
partisans of Al Qaeda and their fellow jihadists willing to commit the most 
heinous acts ostensibly in the name of Islam. Historian Charles Allen has 
provided an in-depth and scholarly look into the very roots of the ideology 
that drives the modern day jihadists of Al Qaeda and their fellow extrem-
ists with this superb and accurately titled book.
Tracing the founding of the Wahhabi cult to a Sunni Muslim named 
Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, who in the 1740s authored his Book of 
Unity in which al-Wahhab rejected any innovation, interpreted the Quran 
in a literalist way while tacitly ignoring a host of Quranic passages that 
forbade harming the innocent, and committed those who would follow his 
heretical teachings to the violent destruction of infidels, polytheists, and 
unbelievers. Al-Wahhab included in his definition of those targeted for 
destruction Christians, Jews, Shias, Sufis, and even mainstream Sunnis 
who did not adopt his radical interpretation of the Quran. Al-Wahhab also 
disregarded the Quran's oft repeated message of mercy, charity, toler-
ance, and compassion, essentially excising numerous Quranic passages to 
justify his call for violent, uncompromising jihad.
The author goes on to chronicle the convergence of al-Wahhab and Wah-
habism with the fortunes of the Royal House of Saud beginning with al-
Wahhab's seeking refuge with Muhammad ibn-Saud in Nedj, having been 
unceremoniously disowned by his own family as a heretic. Al-Wahhab 
married a daughter of ibn-Saud, introduced firearms to Saud's warriors, 
and indoctrinated them in his violent dogma. In their ongoing feud with 
the Ottoman Turks who then controlled Arabia, the newly Wahhabist 
warriors of ibn al-Saud resorted to the most violent tactics, including 
mutilation and killing members of groups targeted by the dogma of Wah-
habism. After siding with the British Empire against the Turks in World 
War I, they ultimately gained control of Arabia for the House of Saud and 
its chosen dogma of Wahhabism. Evolving in parallel in Northern India 
was a no less radical school of Islam known as Deobandism. A reaction to 
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the natural resentment of the indigenous people of the Indian subconti-
nent to the British Raj, Deobandism was a religious movement that led to 
violent uprisings against British rule.
The Deobandi movement has solid Wahabbi roots dating back to the 19th 
Century. It is no less violent or extreme in its dogma, and it is responsible 
for Pakistan's network of 10,000 mudrassa that continue to turn out 
thousands of young boys who are true believers in extremist interpreta-
tions of Islam. Under the reign of dictator General Zia ul-Haq, graduates 
trained in Deobandi mudrassa flocked to fill posts in the Pakistani army, 
secret service, and civil service bureaucracy. When the former Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan, it was Saudi oil money that funded the estab-
lishment of a recruitment and support system for the thousands of foreign 
jihadists, many true believers in Wahhabism, who flocked to wage jihad 
against the Red Army. It was this witch's cauldron of Saudi-funded Wah-
habism, Pakistani-sanctioned Deobandism, and war against the Soviet 
Union that forged Al Qaeda and its bloody cause of international jihad.
Allen meticulously traces the evolution of the Wahabbist cult and its par-
tisans through the 20th Century including the rise of the Muslim Brother-
hood and the eventual influence of Wahabbism on that radical Islamist 
creation of Sayyid Qutb and his successors: his brother Muhammad Qutb 
and the Palestinian Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, who later found sanctuary 
from Egyptian persecution in Saudi Arabia. In the fullness of time, these 
two radical Islamists would play a crucial role in the education and radi-
calization of none other than Usama bin Laden when the future head of Al 
Qaeda enrolled as an undergraduate at King Abdul Aziz University at Jed-
dah. Ibn Laden would later reportedly be one of the first Saudis to fly to 
Afghanistan to join the resistance to the Soviet invasion, encouraged by 
Azzam, who would later follow him. Under Azzam's guidance, ibn Laden 
honed his skills and his leadership abilities as part of what became the 
highly sophisticated Maktab al-Khidamat an-Mujahedeen (Office of Ser-
vices to the Mujahedeen), the logistical support network that assisted over 
twenty five thousand foreign fighters in joining the fight against the Red 
Army in Afghanistan, many of them coming from the most radical Islamic 
organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Allen concludes this journey through heretical religious extremism by 
chronicling the course of events in which Usama bin Laden traveled to 
Afghanistan and reestablished his base of operations, creating a chillingly 
efficient terrorist organization that would go on to perpetrate the attack 
on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Allen makes his case 
in the final chapter that the Muslim umma is overwhelmingly composed 
of honest men and women who wish only to live in peace and practice 
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their faith, and are no more interested in world domination that Christian 
evangelicals who preach their religion seeking to "save" the souls of others 
not initiated in their particular faith. Allen justifiably asserts that extrem-
ists such as Usama bin Laden and groups such as the Taliban are an equal 
threat to the majority of innocent Muslims as they are to the West. It is 
this dedicated and responsible effort by the author to separate the 
extremists from the majority—including those of the Deobandi commu-
nity that has produced its share of honest Muslim leaders as well as hav-
ing its violently radical elements embodied in the Ahl-i-Hadiths—which 
renders this book so invaluable in guiding the reader in untangling and 
understanding the physical and ideological alliances that characterize the 
Islamic extremist movements.
This book should be essential reading for anyone who is seeking to under-
stand the motivations and dogmas of the modern day jihadists and the 
vulnerabilities imposed by their intellectually bankrupt ideology and self-
aggrandizing agendas. This is especially true for law enforcement, mili-
tary, and intelligence professionals working to come to grips with the 
threat posed by this virulent religious cult that has established a bloody 
record of violent terrorism and human rights violations wherever its 
adherents hold sway, from the Middle East to Central Asia to the Pesha-
war Valley. God's Terrorists is the essential tool to lay a solid foundation 
to "Know your enemy as you know yourself…" as Sun Tzu so astutely 
advised over two millennia ago.
Leland Erickson, Henley-Putnam University
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Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and 
Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East. Frederic 
Wehrey, David E. Thaler, Nora Bensahel, Kim Cragin, Jerrold 
D. Green, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Nadia Oweidat, Jennifer Li. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-8330-
4554-6. Maps. Figures. Notes. Tables. Pp xxviii, 202. $40.50.
Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of 
Iranian Power in the Middle East is a RAND Corporation work com-
pleted under the auspices of PROJECT AIR FORCE. In keeping with 
RAND publication standards, the scholarship and research are impecca-
ble, and the conclusions offer practical applications for decision and poli-
cymakers grappling with ever-evolving strategic realities. The following 
discussion encapsulates the salient concepts and ideas regarding Iranian 
political and social developments as presented by the authors in this 
work.
The U.S. and Iran have not had diplomatic relations since the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979. Both countries have been in a stalemate, occasionally 
advancing feeble initiatives that have gone nowhere. Tensions over the 
U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with a desire to be the pre-
eminent power in the Gulf, have resulted in Tehran's current muscle flex-
ing to see how far it can push Washington without provoking open mili-
tary conflict. As Iran perceives itself to be encircled, isolated, and without 
any allies in an area it regards as its own neighborhood, its outward 
behavior and its true intentions may send conflicting signals. Faced with 
technologically superior U.S. airpower that it can not conventionally meet 
head-on in its own backyard, Iran's bellicose rhetoric may choreograph a 
basic desire for recognition and respect, which if not granted, may lead 
Tehran to engage in asymmetric acts of aggression.
Iran's strategic culture is characterized by a combination of assertiveness 
(intentions) and caution (capabilities). On the one hand, Tehran craves 
respect both regionally and globally (intentions), and uses inflammatory 
language to press its case for this stature. On the other hand, the Iranian 
leadership also realizes in a Realpolitik sense that its true military and 
political options are limited (capabilities). However, Iran still attempts to 
advance its agenda in the region through cautious leveraging of influence 
and behind the scenes use of terrorist groups. Iran's regional strategy 
relies upon three principal factors: deterrence, support for Islamists and 
non-state actors, and appeals to Arab public opinion. Deterrence has util-
ity in both the psychological and military realms as long as push doesn't 
come to shove. Support for Shi'ite and Sunni terrorist groups such as 
Hizbollah and Hamas carries both political and symbolic value in terms of 
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Tehran exhibiting its "pan-Islamic credentials" within the Middle East 
and Muslim world. Flamboyant, direct appeals to Arab public opinion 
modeled on the style of late Egyptian President Gamal 'Adb al-Nasr have 
often fallen flat as Tehran perceives it has more influence than it really 
does.
Because it cannot directly confront the U.S. in a conventional military 
sense (although it would like to have that capability), Iran has dedicated 
its time and resources to developing a robust asymmetric capacity and 
doctrine. Conventional Iranian forces are mired in bureaucratic inertia, 
partisan infighting, and, due to lack of procurement initiatives, obsolete, 
poorly maintained equipment. In fact, Tehran's multi-layered and over-
lapping security apparatus is better positioned for internal security efforts 
geared towards regime survival than defending the country from external 
military threats. Iran's asymmetric capabilities are more potent, present-
ing a more threatening ability that emphasizes deterrence and guerrilla 
warfare using the model Hizbollah has developed in Lebanon. In addi-
tion, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has an arsenal of 
anti-ship mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, and "swarming" tactics to use 
against superior naval forces in the geo-strategically important Strait of 
Hormuz.
The Iranian military strategy focuses on (1) maintaining internal stability 
and unity through use of military, intelligence, law enforcement, and 
paramilitary forces; (2) employing exaggeration, ambiguity, and obfusca-
tion to deter aggression from the U.S. and its regional allies; (3) in-depth 
homeland defense to counter an invasion; and (4) using its armed forces 
to extend its influence through intimidation, dissuasion, and coercion in 
order to gain regional and global prestige.
Regarding Iran's interplay with terrorist, extremist, and dissident move-
ments, Tehran perceives itself as more influential than it really is. The 
Islamic Republic has supported and financed activities of Hizbollah, Pal-
estinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hamas in efforts to compensate for its 
conventional inferiority. However, in the event of a conflict with the U.S., 
support from these groups is by no means a given, suggesting that Iran 
exerts influence over these allies, but not control. During the early years 
of the Islamic Republic, Tehran sought to export "Islamic Revolution" to 
other countries. After watching the excesses of the Iranian Revolution 
with horror, Muslim countries turned away from the Iranian model, seek-
ing a more moderate approach to emulate.
The Arab world's perception of Iran does not necessarily match Tehran's. 
Iran's direct appeals to the "Arab street" undermine some Arab govern-
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ments while also bypassing established diplomatic protocols. Gulf States 
also mistrust Tehran's intentions towards non-Iranian Shi'ite popula-
tions. Arab states have a dual view of the Iranian nuclear program. On the 
one hand, they fear Tehran's regional ambitions. On the other hand, they 
endorse it as a critique of western "double standards." They also hope that 
the U.S. will not view any Arab criticism of Iran's program as tacit 
approval for a strike.
The book closes with a series of policy recommendations for the U.S. 
Acknowledging that past efforts and a Cold War style containment policy 
have failed, the authors recommend a new set of paradigms. One of the 
recommendations is for the U.S. to bolster international sanctions and 
financial pressure as a means of dissuading Iran's nuclear ambitions 
while at the same time avoiding punitive measures that have little mean-
ing or support. Another option advocates bi-lateral discussions to forge 
common ties in areas of mutual concern such as the ongoing contingen-
cies in Iraq and Afghanistan, narcotics trafficking, disaster relief, refu-
gees, and humanitarian crises. Notably absent was a recommendation for 
substantive discussions regarding terrorism. The last suggestion was to 
have a multilateral regional security framework that includes Iran yet is 
sensitive to Arab concerns.
Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of 
Iranian Power in the Middle East is a valuable guide to better understand 
Washington's strategic options vis-à-vis Tehran. It has merit for national 
security strategists, Middle East specialists, policymakers, and decision 
makers involved with long-term solutions to Gulf security paradigms. For 
Iran watchers and specialists, it is a must-have for the library.
Mark J. Roberts, Transportation Security Administration
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They Dared Return: The Untold Story of Jewish Spies Behind 
the Lines in Nazi Germany. By Patrick K. O'Donnell, 
Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-306-81800-
4. Photos, Appendices, Notes, Index, Pp. 240. $26.00
This historical account of the work accomplished by a few of the agents of 
the Office of Strategic Services in World War II is sure to intrigue all read-
ers interested in military history and especially World War II history. 
Patrick K. O'Donnell has done a masterful job of recounting events which 
had a vast impact, especially in Austria, in the closing days of the Nazi 
Third Reich. Beyond the simple recounting of events there are lessons 
that do not change for operatives over time, but sometimes do need to be 
reinforced.
Patrick K. O'Donnell is an established military historian who has 
authored five previous books. Among them are Beyond Valor (winner of 
the William E. Colby Award), and the acclaimed account of the Battle of 
Fallujah, We Were One. O'Donnell has long been interested in World War 
II and has interviewed a large number of WWII veterans. Some eight 
years prior to the publication of They Dared Return, he met Fredrick 
Mayer. After extensive interviews with Mayer and his best friend and fel-
low OSS veteran, Hans Wynberg, O'Donnell decided to tell the story of 
these men and others.
The book recounts the incredible courage and heroism of the "Jewish 
Five" as Mayer and his friends are referred to in the book. These men 
were Jewish refugees from the early days of the Nazi regime in Germany 
who had escaped and come to the United States for a new life. When the 
U.S. entered WWII each of them had enlisted to fight for their "adopted" 
country. Because of their backgrounds and language skills, they were 
recruited for the OSS to serve as spies behind the lines. The drama was 
increased because the OSS teams included "volunteer" German soldiers. 
These were "former" Prisoners of War who had deserted and surrendered, 
or been captured by Allied forces in battle.
The accounts of the early OSS efforts to train the Jewish recruits and vet 
the POWs for anti-Nazi sentiments are quite interesting. OSS Agent 
Mayer could have died before his first mission when the OSS placed him 
in a POW camp for three days to see if he could pass as a German soldier. 
Mayer passed the test and identified a captured German officer named 
Franz Weber who would be instrumental in his future mission as one of 
the anti-Nazi volunteers for the OSS.
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O'Donnell decided he could not do justice to all the missions of the Jewish 
Five in one book. He chose to concentrate this work on Fredrick Mayer 
and Operation Greenup. The other agents and their missions fit into the 
account as they touch upon Operation Greenup, and O'Donnell recounts 
that each operation deserves to have its story told in a separate book. He 
did include original mission reports in Appendices A through F, which 
provide some insights into the activities of all the teams.
Many people are inclined to believe that all German citizens, except the 
Jewish ones, in World War II were supporters of Adolph Hitler and the 
Third Reich. It is clear from the accounts of the Jewish Five that a lot of 
support for their activities was received not only from citizens, but even 
from some elected officials and some of the criminal police or Krimi-
nalpolizei. Of course by the point Operation Greenup was able to achieve 
the greatest success, even some ardent Nazis with a pragmatic outlook 
were willing to try to cut deals for a chance at lenient treatment when the 
war ended. Mayer (and some others) was able to take great advantage of 
this mindset and even after capture and torture he achieved great results 
by using his wits. Through the assistance of the imaginative lies of one of 
the "volunteer" POWs, Hermann Matull, Mayer managed to turn his 
plight as a captured spy into a stunning success. The resulting events 
saved lives that would have otherwise been lost in battles which would not 
have changed the eventual outcome of the war.
Matull, who has vanished into the mists of history, was a German 
deserter/con man/black marketeer, whose ability to spin stories would be 
a huge advantage for any intelligence operative. He was well prepared for 
his mission back into Germany and the OSS took tremendous pains to 
equip him with documents and uniforms designed to pass close scrutiny. 
His downfall and capture resulted from a minor oversight; Matull used 
American cigarettes and matches in Germany. Another spy, Paul Krock, 
was carrying forged German documents stamped with a round stamp. A 
keen-eyed German NCO knew from his own service in the area repre-
sented that the stamp should have been square. These small errors 
betrayed all the elaborate preparations for the spies to move about freely. 
To compound the grievous situation, OSS Headquarters failed to recog-
nize Matull was transmitting under duress even when he inserted extra 
words in his messages as he had been trained to do in order to signal a 
major problem. It is almost unbelievable that he was able to talk his way 
out of execution and set the stage for Mayer to arrange the surrender of 
Innsbruck.
Some may wonder what relevance this historical tribute could have to the 
general field of espionage today. Certainly all of us have been conditioned 
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through the years to believe we should "learn from our experiences" and 
"not make the same mistake twice." Unfortunately, while many individu-
als internalize these concepts and profit from the lessons of life, too often 
governments and other organizations seem doomed to repeat mistakes of 
the past. History is valuable as a learning tool on a broad scale. The brief 
examples of the failure to pay sufficient attention to small details such as 
those which led to the capture of Matull and Krock are lessons which can 
help better prepare agents for future missions.
In an even broader sense, the most important lessons of They Dared 
Return may be in some questions today's practitioner might consider, 
rather than explicit examples such as the failure to attend to the smallest 
detail or the failure to recognize signs of a problem with an agent in dis-
tress. One lesson that springs to mind is the question of whether an 
agency, or individual, is really "thinking outside the box." It is unclear 
who originated the idea of recruiting Jewish personnel for these missions, 
but the properly motivated and courageous men were located and volun-
teered. The "thinking outside the box" aspect of organizing the teams 
occurred when someone conceived of the idea of also recruiting "deserter-
volunteers" from among the available captured enemy soldiers and vet-
ting them to establish they could be entrusted with the sensitive task of 
going back into Germany with the Jewish spies.
There is an even more strategic question one must consider in reading an 
account of the efforts of these OSS agents. That question is whether 
today's espionage efforts have a place for human intelligence. Have we 
come to rely on modern technology at the expense of the effective utiliza-
tion of human assets? If the current technology had been available more 
than 65 years ago, would these dangerous missions have been sanc-
tioned? Much more important—when reading the account of what these 
men accomplished, one must ask if the exceptional results could have 
possibly been achieved without the investment in human assets on the 
ground? Obviously the networking, negotiations, and the exploitation of 
enemy personnel weaknesses on the ground could not have been achieved 
without face-to-face contact with the OSS agents.
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They Dared Return will appeal to the discerning reader as a historical 
record of significant World War II actions, serving as a tribute to the her-
oism and dedication of OSS agents, former enemy soldiers, and some 
individuals who remained within Nazi Germany during the war. The book 
also has useful lessons and can motivate insightful questions, the answers 
to which may impact our future direction in espionage activities.
Millard E. Moon, Ed.D., Colonel (ret.), U.S. Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations
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